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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-3329 
____________ 
 
OMARLEY CURNANDY HUDSON, AKA Hudson O'Maley, AKA Shelby Clark, 
AKA Stephen Young, AKA Shelby Hernandez Clark, 
                                                              Petitioner  
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                               Respondent 
____________ 
 
On Petition for Review from an 
Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A209-308-350) 
Immigration Judge:  Walter A. Durling 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 2018 
 
Before:  SHWARTZ, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: February 7, 2019) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
Case: 17-3329     Document: 003113154793     Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/07/2019
  
2 
 Omarley Hudson petitions for review of a final order of removal. To the extent 
that Hudson argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals applied an incorrect standard 
of review, we will deny his petition. We will dismiss the remainder of the petition for 
lack of jurisdiction. 
I.  
 Hudson is a native and citizen of Jamaica. He grew up in a Kingston neighborhood 
that was heavily influenced by competing political parties: the People’s National Party 
and the Jamaica Labor Party. His mother supported the People’s National Party in 
exchange for financial and other support.  
 The parties exercised influence and control within Hudson’s neighborhood. 
Residents avoided opposition areas for fear of physical violence. On one occasion, 
Hudson was beaten with bats and cut with a knife when he walked home from school in 
the rival party area. Several of his friends lost their lives at the hands of the political 
parties. 
 Around age thirteen, Hudson began assisting the People’s National Party. Twice, 
he was given a gun and instructed to convince reluctant voters to vote for the party. When 
he was about sixteen years old, he was pressured to contribute more and prove himself by 
murdering his neighbor, a rival party member. Instead, Hudson fled to the United States 
in 2002. He overstayed his visitor’s visa and has remained in the United States, accruing 
convictions for drug and firearm offenses.  
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In 2017, Hudson was ordered to be removed because of his aggravated felony 
convictions.1 He expressed a reasonable fear of returning to Jamaica and was ultimately 
referred to an Immigration Judge (IJ) for withholding proceedings.2 He applied for 
protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), testifying that his “cousin 
informed him before he left Jamaica that he was considered a snitch” and that “the 
enforcement arm” of the party was “looking for him.”3 The IJ denied his application for 
CAT protection, finding that although he did not lack credibility, there is no evidence that 
anyone in Jamaica is currently looking for him, or that the government would acquiesce 
to any torture of Hudson. The IJ found that these fears were not objectively corroborated. 
The BIA affirmed. It ruled that the IJ did not clearly err and that Hudson’s 
“speculation as to future harm is insufficient to meet his burden of proof.”4  
II.  
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).5 Where a removal order is 
based on an aggravated felony conviction, we have jurisdiction to review only 
“constitutional claims or questions of law,”6 which we review de novo.7  
                                              
1 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1228(b)(1), (2). 
2 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) (providing for referral of case to IJ where alien has 
reasonable fear of persecution or torture). 
3 App’x 18. 
4 App’x 9. 
5 Pierre v. Att’y Gen., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D); Pierre, 528 F.3d at 184. 
7 Silva-Rengifo v. Att’y Gen., 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007), as amended (Mar. 6, 
2007). 
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III. 
Hudson raises three arguments: (1) the BIA applied the incorrect standard of 
review; (2) the evidence showed that it is more likely than not that he will be tortured if 
he returns to Jamaica; and (3) the evidence showed that public officials in Jamaica would 
be willfully blind to his torture. “We . . . need to determine, as to each claim, whether it 
involves a constitutional or legal question over which we have jurisdiction, and only then 
may we analyze the merits.”8 
Hudson argues, first, that the BIA applied an incorrect standard of review—more 
specifically, that the BIA’s opinion was “devoid of analysis” and therefore, “it is unclear 
under what standard the [BIA] reviewed the underlying decision.”9 On this basis, Hudson 
requests a remand to the BIA for additional analysis. 
Whether the BIA applied the correct standard of review is a legal question that we 
have jurisdiction to review.10 Having reviewed the argument, we conclude that it fails on 
its merits. The BIA did not apply an incorrect standard, nor is its standard unclear. The 
BIA correctly explained that it reviews the IJ’s findings of fact under the “clearly 
erroneous” standard and all other issues, including issues of law, discretion, and 
                                              
8 Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 102 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Aug. 23, 
2006). 
9 Appellant’s Br. 14. 
10 See Alaka, 456 F.3d at 103; Pareja v. Att’y Gen., 615 F.3d 180, 187-88 (3d Cir. 
2010). 
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judgment, under a de novo standard.11 Then, in light of Hudson’s arguments attacking the 
IJ’s factual determinations, it reviewed those determinations for clear error. It considered 
several pertinent facts, such as that fifteen years had passed since Hudson was last 
threatened and that letters from his family did not mention any threats. This constitutes an 
adequate review of the IJ’s factual determinations under the correct standard. The opinion 
is only five paragraphs long, but brevity is not error. “The [BIA] ‘is not required to write 
an exegesis on every contention,’ . . . but only to show that it has reviewed the record and 
grasped the movant’s claims.”12 The BIA did so. 
Hudson’s second argument is that he carried his burden to show that he is more 
likely than not to be tortured if returned to Jamaica. We begin by determining whether 
this argument “involves a constitutional or legal question over which we have 
jurisdiction.”13 Hudson attempts to frame the argument as a legal one. He contends that 
the IJ failed to consider all of the evidence and that as a result, the BIA was unable to 
articulate a rationale for affirming. He also asserts that the IJ erred by requiring 
corroborative evidence that was not reasonably available. 
Despite Hudson’s focus on the IJ’s opinion, our review “extends only to the 
decision of the BIA.”14 Even if Hudson is correct that the purported shortcomings in the 
                                              
11 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i), (ii). 
12 Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 178 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
13 Alaka, 456 F.3d at 102. 
14 Kayembe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[O]nly if the BIA 
expressly adopts or defers to a finding of the IJ, will we review the decision of the IJ.”). 
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IJ’s opinion should be imputed to the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to consider this argument 
because, upon examination, it is clearly factual, not legal. Hudson does not point to any 
specific fact that the IJ overlooked; rather, he recaps the evidence and asserts that he 
carried his burden. In addition, both the IJ and the BIA fully articulated their rationales. 
The IJ’s discussion of the evidence spans multiple pages. The BIA affirmed based on the 
evidence that no one has threatened Hudson in the past fifteen years, that supportive 
letters from his family did not mention any threats, and that Hudson’s “own testimony 
omitted any description of such threats.”15 The BIA did not base its determination on any 
lack of corroborating evidence.  
In sum, Hudson’s second argument is essentially factual, and we lack jurisdiction 
to review it.16 “[A]rguments such as that an [IJ] or the BIA incorrectly weighed evidence, 
failed to consider evidence or improperly weighed equitable factors are not questions of 
law . . . .”17 “Artful labeling” does not confer jurisdiction on us.18  
Hudson’s third and final argument is that the IJ erred in concluding that the 
evidence did not show that the Jamaican government would acquiesce in the torture that, 
                                              
15 App’x 9. 
16 Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006). 
17 Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184, 189 (3d Cir. 2007). 
18 Id. (holding that allegations of “‘clear factual mistakes’ that resulted in a ‘denial 
of due process’” do not amount to constitutional claims subject to review under § 1252) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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he argues, is likely. He argues that because the BIA never addressed the issue, we should 
remand for further factual determinations.  
Because the BIA concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in finding that Hudson 
was not likely to be tortured, it did not need to reach the issue of Jamaican public 
officials’ acquiescence. Failure to meet either prong—likelihood of torture or 
acquiescence of public officials—is fatal to a claim under the CAT. 19 Therefore, the BIA 
did not need to reach the question of acquiescence, and we need not remand for factual 
determinations on this issue. 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition in part and dismiss it in part 
for lack of jurisdiction. 
                                              
19 Green v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Green bears the burden 
of showing both that he would likely suffer harm if returned to Jamaica and that the harm 
would amount to the legal definition of torture. Because . . . Green had failed to satisfy 
the second prong . . . , there was no need to make a factual finding as to the first prong.”); 
see also INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“[C]ourts and 
agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary 
to the results they reach.”). 
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